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DOCUMENT 
(801) 673-4892 
SO 
DOCKET NO.. /?,=>?a 
Mr, Geoffrey Butler 
332 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
April 21st, 1987 
IN RE: Trees v. Lewis, case no. 19333 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 27 (j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I 
submit the following citation of supplemental authorities in 
reference to the alleged signature requirement of my client 
Mr. Trees. 
At oral argument on the 10th day of February, 1987, 
Appellant's counsel, Mr. Bell, implied that Trees had not in 
fact signed Exhibit P15, which both parties stipulated was 
part of the "option" referred to throughout the trial. 
This point was argued in my brief at pages 26-27, but may 
also be further moot pursuant to the case of Baldwin v. 
Vantage Corporation, 676 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah 1984). Indeed, 
perhaps the Appellant Lewis was the only party, who in fact 
needed to have signed P15 in the first instance. See 
Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986). 
Yours Very Truly, 
^yn^ji^^^ 
Michael D. Hughes 
- * £ - ^ -
APR221987 
MDH/sm 
cc 
encl. Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of April, 
198 7, I did mail a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing letter to Mr. J. Richard Bell, Appellant's 
counsel, 303 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, 
postage prepaid. 
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i of the defendant's verbal statements^ ^
 n t a t i o n ; (4) oral contract for 
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 b remanded for ^ p ^ i e « r m e d » 
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further proceedings. 
HALL, CJ., and OAKS, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ, concur. 
Carl BALDWIN and Larry Gleim, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
VANTAGE CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 18202. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 18, 1984. 
Purchasers brought action against ven-
»ttsz^z££ 
S
p
eJ "under " e contract. The Fourth Dis-
S c t Court, Utah County, J. Robert Bull 2 ? t e ^ r e d Judgment f° r Vend°p « 
ntchasers appealed. The Supreme Court, 
^ J held that (1) trial court properly 
S s d discretion in relieving vendor o 
udidal admission, made in pleading, that 
l i t of vendor had guaranteed availabu -
£ of construction financing to purchasers 
T e e conduct of both parties throughout 
Remainder of proceedings showed that 
misrepresentation; \*> v**** ^ 
sale of land was sufficiently performed to 
remove contract from statute of frauds; 
and (5) vendor would not be unjustly en-
riched by foreclosure sale. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, J., dissented. 
1. Evidence <3=>265(8) 
Admission of a fact in pleading is a 
judicial admission and is. normally conclu-
sive on party making it 
2. Evidence <3=>265(8) 
Trial court may relieve party from con-
sequences of a judicial admission. 
3. Evidence <fc=>265(8) 
In action for rescission of contract for 
sale of land and restitution of amounts paid 
under the contract, trial court properly re-
lieved defendant vendor from consequences 
of admission, made in pleading, that its 
agent guaranteed availability of construc-
tion financing to purchasers, since conduct 
of both parties to remainder of proceeding 
showed that question of guarantee was a 
material issue for judge to determine, pur-
chasers did not rely on admission nor were 
they misled by it, resolution of that issue 
would weigh heavily in determining out-
come of case, and defendants denied exist-
ence of guarantee in another part of an-
swer and in deposition. 
4. Principal and Agent e=>190(2) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in rejecting purchasers' testimony that ven-
dor's agent extended them guarantee of 
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couotru'Lu.n ..nancing, even though agent 
was able to testify only that he could not 
mber making such guarantee, where 
......or presented testimony that agent did 
not have authority to make such guarantee 
and that such guarantees were rarely 
made, and no evidence was presented that 
details of alleged guaranteed loan were 
discussed. 
5. Evidence «»588 
Testimony of witnesses is to be gi veil 
such weight and credibility as trier of fact 
may find reasonable under circumstances. 
6. Fraud e»58(l) 
In regard to purchasers3' claim for mis-
representation based on alleged guarantee 
of construction financing by agent of ven-
dor, trial court properly held purchasers to 
preponderance of evidence standard, no: to 
clear and convincing evidence standard, in 
their attempt to prove misrepresents ^ <"~ 
7. Frauds, Statute of <e>129(5) 
Part performance of oral contract : 
sale of seven lots was sufficient to remt ; r 
contract from statute of frauds, wh^rc 
both parties admitted existence of contract 
where there was no dispute over material 
terms except alleged guarantee of con-
struction financing, and where purchasers 
had made down payment, two interest pay-
ments, and fully paid for and received con-
veyances from defendant to three of seven 
lots U.C.A.1953, 25-5-1. 
8. Implied and Constructive Contracts 
<5=»8 
Vendor would not be unjustly enhcr.u-; 
by foreclosure sale on lots, notwithstand-
ing fact that purchasers had paid ten pur-
cent of principal and interest for two ye-rs 
on contract balance, since any amount d* • 
rived from sale of lots and foreclosure s:\.v 
over and above amount owing vendor was 
directed to be paid to purchasers, and p -
chasers were given six months to redeem 
lots from foreclosure sale. • - ' • -
Ray M. Harding, Jr., Pleasant Grove, fcr 
plaintiffs and appellants. 
Edward M. Garrett and Joseph E. Hatch, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and respon-
dent 
;
 HO'WE, Justice: " •' ' 
Plaintiffs Carl Baldwin and .Larry Gleim, 
partners in the construction business, bring 
this appeal from an adverse judgment in a 
suit which they brought for the rescission 
of a contract and the restitution of all 
amounts they had paid under it. Defend-
ant Vantage Corporation is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Deseret Federal Savings and 
Loan Association. Vantage was engaged 
in the development of Blackhawk Estates 
in Pleasant Grove, Utah. Doug Boulton 
was the project manager of Vantage and 
also a vice-president of Deseret Federal 
In the spring of 1978, plaintiffs met with 
Boulton and negotiated a contract to pur-
chase seven lots in Plat C of the Blackhawk 
r
^
r
*tes from Vantage. No written con-
was ever presented at trial; however, 
•x* the terms of the sale were undis-
Plaintiffs paid $8,950 as a 10% 
down payment on lot numbers 18, 19 and 
2S (at $13,500 per lot) and on lot numbers 
J4f 35, 49 and 58 (at $12,500 per lot). The 
interest rate was 11% per annum, for the 
first year after electrical power was made 
available to the lots and 13%' per annum 
thereafter. No duration of the contract 
was set; however, it can be assumed that it 
, as short-term given its high interest rate 
and considering Vantage's objectives for 
• 'iering into the sale. In addition, Van-
..ie agreed to subordinate its interest in 
"he lots so that plaintiffs could secure con-
struction financing, provided that such fi-
; -incing came from Deseret Federal 
?: ere was likewise no dispute that plain-
t.;"fs made interest payments of $4,278.59 
-nd $2,990.32 and sold three of the seven 
undeveloped lots to third parties in 1979. 
In the spring of 1980, plaintiffs sought a 
.. instruction loan from Deseret Federal to 
build "spec homes" on. two of the remain-
ing four lots. Deseret Federal denied the 
request for a loan pursuant to its policy, 
tnen in force, to lend no money for building 
speculation; that is, building homes to put 
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on the market as 
homes for particular buyers. When they 
could not obtain construction funds else-
where, plaintiffs sought to rescind the con-
tract to purchase the lots and to recover 
the amounts they had paid in principal and 
interest Defendants counterclaimed to 
foreclose plaintiffs' interest in the four 
lots. 
At trial, both plaintiffs testified that dur-
ing the 1978 negotiations Boulton "guaran-
teed" that construction financing would be 
available from Deseret Federal when they 
were ready to build. Boulton, who admit-
ted that only he and the plaintiffs were 
present, could not remember making any 
guarantee. He stated further that he nei-
ther had authority to bind Deseret Federal 
to grant a loan in the future nor to process 
real property loans. In addition, there was 
evidence that guaranteeing the availability 
of future loans was not a normal practice 
of officers of either Vantage or Deseret 
Federal 
The trial court found that plaintiffs 
failed to prove that defendant's agent Boul-
ton made a guarantee as to the availability 
of construction financing. It then conclud-
ed that the statute of frauds, U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 25-5-1, could not be used by the plain-
tiffs as a basis for rescission because there 
was either sufficient memoranda or part 
performance to take the contract out of the 
statute. Rescission was denied plaintiffs 
and foreclosure was granted to the defend-
ant. 
[1-3] Plaintiffs first contend that the 
trial court erred in finding that no guaran-
tee existed because defendant had admitted 
the guarantee in its answer to the plain-
tiffs' complaint. Therefore, plaintiffs ar-
gue, the existence of the guarantee should 
stand as a stipulated fact An admission of 
fact in a pleading is a judicial admission 
and is normally conclusive on the party 
making i t Yates v. Large, 284 Or. 217, 
585 P.2d 697 (1978). See also Paul 
Schoonover, Inc. v. Ram Construction, 
Inc., 129 Ariz. 204, 630 P.2d 27 (1981). 
However, this rule is not absolute. The 
trial court may relieve a party from the 
BALDWIN v. VANTAGE CORP. Utah 415 
Cite as 676 P.2d 413 (Utah 1984) 
opposed to building consequences of a judicial admission. See 
9 Wigmore on Evidence (1981), § 2590. 
See also McCormick on Evidence, 2nd Ed. 
1972, § 265. In the instant case, the de-
fendant admitted the guarantee in answer-
ing the plaintiffs' first cause of action. 
However, in answering the plaintiffs' 
fourth cause of action, which was based on 
fraud, the defendant denied that it had 
represented that it would guarantee financ-
ing. Thus the defendant's answer was con-
tradictory. Further, subsequent to the fil-
ing of the defendant's answer, the plain-
tiffs propounded interrogatories to the de-
fendant, one of which inquired whether the 
defendant ever stated that it would guaran-
tee construction loans on the lots. Defend-
ant answered this interrogatory with an 
unequivocal "No." At the pretrial hearing, 
counsel for the defendant stated that his 
client had made no promise to make con-
struction loans. Counsel for the plaintiffs 
made no response to that statement, but 
indicated that "it will be a factual issue." 
At the trial, both parties presented testimo-
ny regarding the guarantee as though it 
had not been admitted in the pleadings. It 
was clear that the resolution of this issue 
would weigh heavily in determining the 
outcome of the case. Defendant tried to 
establish that Boulton did not make the 
guarantee and that such procedure was 
uncommon among its personnel. Plain-
tiffs, with equal vigor, adduced testimony 
both to establish the guarantee's existence 
and to show its importance in their determi-
nation to make the purchase. It was not 
until counsel for the plaintiffs was making 
his final argument to the judge after the 
close of the evidence that he pointed out 
the admission in the defendant's answer. 
Under these facts it is clear that while 
defendant may have negligently admitted 
its existence in answering the complaint, 
the conduct of both parties throughout the 
remainder of the proceeding showed that 
this question was a material issue for the 
judge to determine. Plaintiffs did not rely 
on the admission nor were they misled by 
it. There is authority that an admission 
may be waived where the parties treat the 
admitted fact as an issue. In Re Withing-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ton's Estate, 99 Cal.App. 617, 279 P. 196 
(1929); 71 OJ.S. § 161, pg. 335. There-
fore, we decline to interfere with the trial 
court's discretion in not holding defendant 
to its admission in its answer. 
Plaintiffs further contend that the trial 
court abused its discretion by arbitrarily 
finding that no guarantee had been made; 
that the uncontradicted testimony of the 
plaintiffs established its making, and Boul-
ton did not testify that he did not make a 
guarantee but only that he "could not re-
member" making a guarantee. Plaintiffs 
rely upon McClellan v. David, 84 Nev. 283, 
439 P.2d 673 (1968), where the Nevada 
Supreme Court found an abuse of discre-
tion by the trial court in setting aside a 
default judgment. There, a secretary in 
the office of the plaintiffs attorney testi-
fied with exactness that she had conversed 
three times with the defendant by tele-
phone soon after he had been served with 
summons about the necessity of his filing 
an answer to the complaint. Her recollec-
tion of the conversations was refreshed 
from written notes made by her at the 
time. The defendant did not deny the con-
versations, but simply testified that he did 
not recall them. The trial court relieved 
the defendant of his default, but that rul-
ing was reversed on appeal. After the 
court held that there was no fundamental 
conflict in the testimony requiring it to 
adhere to the trial court's finding in favor 
of the defendant, the court said: 
Testimony of a witness that he does not 
remember whether a certain event took 
place does not contradict positive testi-
mony that such event or conversation 
took place. Bender v. Roundup Mining 
Co., 138 Mont. 306, 356 P.2d 469, 471 
(1960); Tennent v. Leary, 81 Ariz. 243, 
304 P.2d 384, 387 (1956). See also: Com-
ment Note—Comparative value of posi-
tive and negative testimony. 98 A.L.R. 
161. Therefore, we hold that there was 
no credible evidence before the lower 
court to show that the neglect of [the 
defendant] was excusable under the cir-
cumstances. 
We have no quarrel with the rule nor 
with its application to the facts of that 
case. However, in Bender v. Roundup 
Mining Co., supra, one of the cases cited 
by the Nevada court in support of the rule, 
the court there recognized that even 
though a witness's testimony is not directly 
controverted by other verbal testimony, the 
credibility of the witness and the weight to 
be given his testimony are questions to be 
determined by the trial court. In the 
McClellan case, there was no doubt cast 
upon the credibility of the secretary's testi-
mony since she had made written notes of 
her conversations with the defendant 
(which conversations the defendant could 
not remember). In the Bender case, how-
ever, the court upheld the trial court, which 
chose to disbelieve the testimony of an 
injured miner and his wife that the miner 
had reported an accident to an employee in 
the mining company's office. The employ-
ee testified that he had no recollection of 
any such report being made to him by the 
miner and that if he had made such a 
report he would have referred him to his 
foreman and that he had no recollection of 
doing that. Other factors which cast doubt 
upon the credibility of the miner's testimo-
ny were that he did not complain to his 
foreman or anyone else in the mine on the 
night the alleged accident happened; al-
though he was absent from work for a 
brief period, neither the foreman's absen-
tee report nor the miner's physician's re-
port indicated that he had reported the 
suffering of any accidental injury. In view 
of these and other factors which reflected 
doubt on the plaintiffs testimony, the Mon-
tana court held that the Industrial Accident 
Board and the trial court were not 
compelled to believe the plaintiffs testimo-
ny that he had sustained an accident and 
had reported it to his employer as he 
claimed. 
[4,5] We likewise find in the instant 
case that the trial court was not compelled 
to believe the plaintiffs' testimony that 
Boulton extended to them a guarantee of 
construction financing even though Boul-
ton was only able to testify that he could 
not remember making such a guarantee. 
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BALDWIN v. VANTAGE CORP. 
Cite as 676 P.2d 413 (Utah 1984) 
Utah 417 
Defendant presented testimony that Boul-
ton had no authority to make a guarantee 
of a loan, and guarantees were rarely made 
by officials of Deseret Federal or Vantage. 
Details of the loan, such as the maximum 
or minimum amounts, qualifications, inter-
est rates, payback schedules or even the 
length of this loan, were not discussed. 
Under these circumstances the trial court 
may well have doubted the credibility of 
the plaintiffs' testimony. We believe that 
this case is controlled by the general rule 
that the testimony of witnesses is to be 
given such weight and credibility as the 
trier of fact may find reasonable under the 
circumstances. Guinand v. Walton, 25 
Utah 2d, 253, 480 P.2d 137 (1971). Con-
sidering all the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the successful party and in-
dulging in all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom in support of the judg-
ment, we find no arbitrariness on the part 
of the trial court in rejecting the plaintiffs' 
testimony. 
[6] Plaintiffs further assert that one of 
their claims against the defendant was 
based on misrepresentation which they had 
the burden of proving only by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. They complain that 
the trial court held them instead to proving 
all of the elements of a cause of action for 
fraud by clear and convincing evidence. 
Assuming for the purposes of this case 
that the plaintiffs are correct in their as-
sumption that proof of misrepresentation 
and proof of fraud require different stan-
dards of proof, we find no error. The trial 
court in its findings of fact found that 
"plaintiffs did not sustain the burden of 
proof that any . . . guarantee was made to 
them." The court did not there specify 
what degree of proof it was imposing on 
the plaintiffs. However, the court re-
marked from the bench at the conclusion of 
the trial that "it cannot find by a prepon-
derance of the evidence the agreement to 
provide construction financing." We inter-
pret this finding of fact and statement 
from the bench to mean that the court did 
not believe that any such representation 
was ever made by the defendant. Further-
more, both in a subsequent finding of fact 
Utah Rep. 675-681 P.2d—7 
and in other remarks from the bench, the 
trial court stated that clear and convincing 
proof was required to prove fraud and that 
the plaintiffs had failed to sustain that 
burden. Thus the record indicates that the 
trial court distinguished between the two 
standards of proof and held the plaintiffs 
only to the preponderance standard in their 
attempt to prove misrepresentation. 
Since no guarantee of construction fi-
nancing was found, the plaintiffs' perform-
ance on the contract was not conditional. 
Therefore, their failure to make payments 
as required by the contract constituted a 
breach. Plaintiffs contend, however, that 
because the contract was oral it came with-
in the statute of frauds, U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 25-5-1, and was unenforceable. Being 
unenforceable, the plaintiffs argue, they 
are entitled to rescind the contract and 
recover their payments made thereunder. 
"yX [7] We need not here decide whether a 
buyer of real estate may use the statute of 
frauds to effect a rescission and recover 
his payments. Plaintiffs concede that 
would be an uncommon use of the statute 
since generally the statute is relied upon by 
a vendor to bar a purchaser from enforcing 
an oral contract. Assuming for the pur-
poses of this case that a buyer has such a 
remedy, it clearly was not available to the 
plaintiffs in this case since there had been 
part performance of the contract, thereby 
removing it frojn fhp gtat , l fn n f •fV"mrln, 
§ 25-5-8.MBoth parties admitted the exist-
ence oi tne contract and had no dispute 
over its material terms except for the guar-
antee. The plaintiffs had made a down 
payment and two interest payments and 
had fully paid for and received conveyances 
from the defendant to three of the seven 
lots. This part performance was sufficient 
to remove the contract from the statute of 
frauds under these circumstances where 
theexistence of the contract was admitted. 
MartxnvTScholU Utah, Case JSIo. 17542; 
filed November 14,1983. We find no merit 
in plaintiffs' assertion that there were real-
ly seven separate contracts for the pur-
chase of the lots and any part performance 
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related only to the contracts on the three 
lots the plaintiffs paid for and for which 
they received conveyances. The trial court 
found against this contention, and we sus-
tain that finding. See Sears v. Riemers-
ma, Utah, 655 P.2d 1105 (1982). 
[8] Plaintiffs lastly complain that they 
had paid ten percent of the principal and 
two years' interest on the contract balance, 
and they will lose those amounts in the 
foreclosure by the defendant They charge 
the defendant will thereby be unjustly en-
riched at their expense. We disagree. By 
foreclosure, the defendant cannot receive 
more than what the plaintiffs promised to 
pay in the contract, an amount not disputed 
by the plaintiffs. Any amount derived 
from the sale of the lots at foreclosure sale 
over and above the amount owing to the 
defendant was directed to be paid to the 
plaintiffs. In addition, plaintiffs were giv-
en six months to redeem the lots from the 
foreclosure sale. Under these circumstanc-
es there is no element of unjust enrichment 
present 
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are 
awarded to defendant 
HALL, C.J., and OAKS and DURHAM, 
JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., dissents. 
(o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
>*. 2 j T ^ V V * * ' 1 ^ AT 
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WILLIAMS v, 
Cite as 723 P^d 
phernalia), together with the two twenties 
and a ten in Darla Espinoza's apron, the 
previous sale to the confidential informant, 
and Darla Espinoza's statements when the 
police searched the house all support de-
fendants' convictions. , 
: EXPERT WITNESS 
[2] Defendants claims that the trial 
court erred in allowing Officer Olsen to 
give his opinion on whether defendants pos-
sessed the drug paraphernalia and the four 
and one-half ounces of marijuana with the 
intent to distribute the marijuana for value. 
The record reflects, however, that the court 
did not permit the officer to give his opin-
ion regarding defendants' purpose in pos-
sessing the marijuana. Qualification of a 
person as an expert witness under the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, is in the dis-
cretion of the trial court State v. Locke, 
688 P.2d 464 (Utah 1984); see State v. 
Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 (Utah 1982) (decided 
under the now superseded Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 56). We find no abuse of 
discretion in the court's allowing the officer 
to testify as an expert. Officer Olsen had 
been involved in the drug culture as a user 
and a seller for four or five years prior to 
becoming a police officer. He had worked 
for several years as an investigator and 
demonstrated to the court his knowledge of 
the current drug culture before the court 
qualified him as an expert 
SEARCH WARRANT 
[3] Defendants attack the search war-
rant on the ground that it was issued in 
violation of the Aguilar-Spinelli two-
pronged standard. See Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct 584, 21 
L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 
U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 
(1964). We abandoned the Aguilar-Spinel-
li test in State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 
(Utah 1985), and followed the United States 
Supreme Court's more recent decisions in 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct 
2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and Massachu-
setts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727,104 S.Ct 2085, 
80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984). The new standard 
. SINGLETON Utah 421 
421 (Utah 1986) 
looks at the totality of the circumstances 
and holds that the affidavit should be 
viewed in its entirety and in a common 
sense fashion. Under the Anderson stan-
dard, the affidavit was sufficient The of-
ficer had recently received information 
from two confidential informants who were 
in a position to have information about 
drug trafficking in the community. One of 
the informants had previously given the 
officer reliable information. The officer's 
investigation had also revealed that defend-
ants had returned from a drug run to Colo-
rado and were receiving an abnormal num-
ber of guests into their residence who were 
staying but a few minutes.
 ; Finally, one of 
the confidential informants purchased ap-
proximately one-quarter of an ounce of sus-
pected marijuana from defendants on the 
day the warrant was issued. Viewed in its 
entirety and in a common sense fashion, 
the affidavit set out sufficient facts to sup-
port the reliability and credibility of the 
informants relied upon by the officer as 
well as the conclusions of the officer. 
Defendants' convictions are affirmed. 
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM and ZIM-
MERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result 
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Samuel M. WILLIAMS and Shelley 
Thomas Williams, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
Clarie SINGLETON; C.A., Inc., a Utah 
corporation, dba, C.A. Limited; Ameri-
cap Realty, Inc., a Utah corporation; 
and Robert L. Monson, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 20041. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 5, 1986. 
Co-owners of property held in joint ten-
ancy brought action against persons who 
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offered to buy property who later decided 
not to purchase property. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Kenneth 
Rigtrup, J., found no binding agreement 
had been reached between parties under 
earnest money receipt and offer to pur-
chase and thus offerors were entitled to 
return of their earnest money deposit 
Owners appealed. The Supreme Court, 
held that (1) joint tenant did not have 
authority to accept on cotenantfs behalf or 
as her agent without written authority first 
obtained; (2) offer to purchase when ac-
cepted created interest in real estate within 
statute of frauds; and (3) offer to purchase 
failed to ripen into contract to when coten-
ant did not ratify in writing joint tenant's 
acceptance within one-day period contem-
plated by offeror, thus entitling offerors to 
return of earnest money deposit 
Affirmed. ... 
1. Husband and Wife <3=»14.10 
Husband could not bind his wife, who 
was joint tenant of property, by contract he 
made with agent regarding common prop-
erty; thus agent could not accept on wife's 
behalf or as her agent without written au-
thority first obtained. 
2. Frauds, Statute of <3=>74(1) 
An offer to purchase when accepted 
creates an interest in real estate and is 
within statute of frauds. U.C.A.1953, 25-
5-3. 
3. Frauds, Statute of <s=>115(4) 
Language requiring that every agree-
ment authorizing or employing an agent or 
broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation had to be subscribed by par-
ty to be charged therewith did not apply to 
real estate transactions between parties, as 
it dealt instead with claims for commissions 
by agents or brokers. U.C.A.1953, 25-5-1, 
25-5-3, 2&-5-4(5). 
4. Joint Tenancy <s»13 
Offer to purchase property owned in 
joint tenancy never ripened into contract 
where joint tenant failed to ratify in writ-
ing cotenant's acceptance of offer within 
one-day period contemplated by offer; 
thus, offerors were entitled to return of 
earnest money deposit .« 
Cary D. Jones, John T. Anderson, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
Ronald L. Poulton, David R. Blaisdell, 
Salt Lake City, for C.A. Limited and Single-
ton, -^v '"'••>; ' ••'i:"1 ": " - '• ~':- ''•'"•--
Gregory B. Wall,' Salt Lake City, for 
Monson and Americap Realty, Inc. 
PER CURIAM: .: \^,.';-, ~Z', ^ -T-'v 
Plaintiffs appeal from a "summary judg-
ment in favor of defendants. The trial 
court found that no binding agreement had 
been reached between the parties under an 
earnest money receipt and offer to pur-
chase (the contract) and that defendants 
were entitled to the return of their earnest 
money deposit We affirm. 
On appeal from a summary judgment, 
we review the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the losing party. Geneva 
Pipe Co. v. S &H Insurance Co., 714 P.2d 
648 (Utah 1986). Summary judgment is 
proper if the movant is entitled to it as a 
matter of law on the undisputed facts. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Bushnell Real Estate, 
Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983). 
The controlling facts are as follows: 
On August 16, 1983, defendants offered 
to purchase from plaintiffs property owned 
by plaintiffs in joint tenancy. The offer 
was accompanied by a $5,000 earnest mon-
ey deposit and required plaintiffs to accept 
within one day. Jodie Bennion, the real 
estate agent for plaintiffs, contacted them 
in California on August 17 and informed 
them of the terms and conditions of the 
offer. In response, Bennion received a 
telegram worded as follows: 
I, Sam Williams, hereby authorize Jodie 
Bennion of Gump & Ayers Real Estate to 
accept an offer to sell my home located 
at 1040 East 1st Avenue Salt Lake City 
$205,000 all of the terms acceptable. 
(Signed) Samuel M. Williams. 
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Bennion then accepted the offer by signing 
"Sam Williams by Jodie Bennion agent tele 
gram attached." Defendants decided not 
to purchase the property, and plaintiffs de-
manded that defendants' earnest money de-
posit be forfeited to plaintiffs. Defendants 
refused, and this suit followed. In opposi-
tion to the motion for summary judgment 
by defendants, plaintiff Shelley Williams 
stated by affidavit that she had instructed 
her husband to accept the offer on her 
behalf and that Bennion had likewise been 
informed of her willingness to sell. The 
trial court ruled that Bennion had accepted 
the offer on behalf of Sam Williams only 
and that without Shelley Williams' signa-
ture on the contract the accepted offer was 
unenforceable under the statute of frauds. 
The court also held that Bennion had no 
authority to accept the offer on plaintiffs' 
behalf as plaintiffs did not give her a writ-
ten power of attorney to so act. Plaintiffs 
assign both those rulings as errors. Inas-
much as we hold that Shelley Williams' 
failure to sign, either personally or through 
her agent, rendered the contract unenforce-
able, we do not reach the merits of the 
second issue. 
Section 25-5-1 of our statute of frauds 
controls the creation of estates or interests 
in real property: 
No estate or interest in real property, 
other than leases for a term not exceed-
ing one year, nor any trust or power over 
or concerning real property or in any 
manner relating thereto, shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or de-
clared otherwise than by act or operation 
of law, or by deed or conveyance in writ-
ing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or 
declaring the same, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
(Emphasis added.) Similar requirements 
govern contracts for leases and sales of 
lands. Section 25-5-3 provides: 
Every contract for the leasing for a long-
er period than one year, or for the sale, 
of any lands, or any interest in lands, 
shall be void unless the contract, or some 
note or memorandum thereof, is in writ-
ing subscribed by the party by whom 
. SINGLETON Utah 4 2 3 
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the lease or sale is to be made, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized in 
writing. 
(Emphasis added.) 
[1] A contract made by telegraph is 
deemed written under section 25-5-7, and 
an agent may sign for his or her principal, 
section 25-5-9, so long as the authority is 
given in writing. Bradshaw v. McBride, 
649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982). Bennion received 
her written authority from Sam Williams 
by telegram and accepted the offer as his 
agent with the telegram attached. Conse-
quently, Sam Williams properly accepted 
the offer of defendants within the time 
required by defendants. However, Sam 
Williams was a joint tenant with Shelley 
Williams and could not have accepted on 
her behalf or as her agent without written 
authority first obtained. There is no hus-
band-wife exception to the statute of 
frauds. Holmgren Bros., Inc. v. Ballard, 
534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975); Coombs v. Ouz-
ounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970). 
One joint tenant or tenant in common can-
not bind his cotenant by a contract which 
he may make relating to the common prop-
erty. Carbine v. Meyer, 126 Cal.App.2d 
386, 272 P.2d 849 (1954). 
Plaintiffs advance several arguments in 
urging us to recognize Sam Williams' ac-
ceptance on behalf of both plaintiffs as 
enforceable against defendants. They 
claim that Shelley Williams expressly au-
thorized her husband and later expressly 
ratified that authorization to sell by ap-
proving and consenting to the filing of 
their complaint against defendants. They 
also claim that only the signature of the 
party to be charged is required on a con-
tract and that the parties to be charged in 
this case were defendants. They conclude 
that in any event the offer here does not 
purport to create, grant, assign, or surren-
der an interest in real property and is 
therefore not a "conveyance" embraced by 
the statute of frauds. 
[2] Contrary to plaintiffs' argument, an 
offer to purchase when accepted creates an 
interest in real estate and is within the 
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statute of frauds. U.CJL, 1953, § 25-5-3, 
supra; Coombs v. Ouzounian, supra; 
Knight v. Chamberlain, 6 Utah 2d 394, 
315 P.2d 273 (1957). 
[3] Plaintiffs' reliance on statutory lan-
guage that "the party to be charged" in 
this case should be defendants is mis-
placed. That language does not appear in 
the sections pertinent to their situation. 
Section 25-5-3 specifically requires that 
the contract be "in writing subscribed by 
the party by whom the sale is to be made." 
Certainly this section governing land con-
tracts, as well as section 25-5-1 governing 
conveyances by deed, mandates expressly 
that a document to be enforceable under 
the statute ofjfcajids must be subscribed 
by the part^^rantin^the conveyance, he-
Vine v. Whitehoust/zi Utah 260, 109 P. 2 
(1910). The provision in section 25-5-4(5) 
that "[e]very agreement authorizing or em-
ploying an agent or broker to purchase or 
sell real estate for compensation" must be 
subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith is inapplicable. It was designed 
to protect owners' of land from fraudulent 
and fictitious claims for commissions, 
Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205 (Utah 1976), 
and has no bearing on real estate transac-
tions between parties. 
Finally, plaintiffs may not use their joint 
complaint against defendants as a written 
ratification by Shelley of Sam's acceptance. 
An offeror may restrict the manner of ac-
ceptance, provided his or her intention to 
do so is clearly expressed. Cochran v. 
Connell, 53 Or.App. 933, 632 P.2d 1385 
(1981), citing 1 Corbin on Contracts § 88, 
373-74 (1963). At the time the offeror 
makes the offer, he or she has full control 
of its terms and may specify the time with-
in which acceptance is limited. McKibben 
v. Mohawk Oil Co., Ltd., 667 P.2d 1223 
(Alaska 1983). Defendants' offer read in 
pertinent part: 
This payment is received and offer is 
made subject to the written acceptance 
of the seller endorsed hereon within one 
days from the date hereof and unless so 
approved, the return of the money herein 
receipted shall cancel this offer without 
• damages to the undersigned agent 
Shelley did not join or ratify in writing 
her husband's acceptance within the one-
day period. Where an offer has expired by 
lapse of time, an attempt to accept is inef-
fectual to create a contract Morrison v. 
Rayen Investment, Inc., 97 Nev. 58, 624 
P.2d 11 (1981). As a corollary, an attempt 
to ratify after the offer has expired by 
lapse of time is equally ineffectual to re-
vive the contract The open-ended rat-
ification urged by plaintiffs would play 
havoc with the laws of offer and accept-
ance and allow joint tenants to effectively 
withhold their joint contractual commit-
ment while bargaining individually until 
the most attractive offer was made, all the 
while holding several offerors to their com-
mitments. In Burg v. Betty Gay of Wash-
ington, Inc., 423 Pa. 485, 225 A.2d 85 
(1966), a similar claim of ratification was 
rejected by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania. The lessor there claimed to have 
ratified the signing of a lease by his agent 
by instituting suit on the lease agreement 
The tenant under the purported lease had 
disavowed any obligation under the lease 
and had never taken possession or paid 
rent to the lessor. Said the court in affirm-
ing the judgment against the lessor. 
If ratification is relied upon in order to 
establish the authority of the agent, it 
must be in writing and executed prior to 
any effective renunciation by the lessee 
of the lease agreement Otherwise, the 
defense of statute of frauds will be avail-
able only to the lessor, which result 
would be totally inconsistent with the 
requirement of mutuality of obligation of 
contracts and with the settled policy that 
either party may raise the defense of the 
statute of frauds. 
Id. 225 A.2d at 86 (citation omitted). 
[4] A similar result is dictated here. 
Under the concept of mutuality of obli-
gation, defendants could not have prevailed 
in enforcing a sale by plaintiffs, had Shel-
ley's failure to join in the acceptance within 
one day been the result of her refusal to 
sell. Coombs v. Ouzounian, supra; 
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Vandsen v. Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180, 487 
.2d 697 (1971); Lee v. Polyhrones, 57 
ftah 401, 195 P. 201 (1921). Defendants 
ffered to purchase the joint interest of 
laintiffs, and Sam negotiated for the sale 
I the joint interest. When Shelley did not 
itify in writing Sam's acceptance within 
le one-day period contemplated by the of-
»r, the offer never ripened into a contract, 
id defendants were entitled to have the 
irnest money deposit returned to them. 
ee Walk v. Miller, 650 P.2d 1286 (Colo. 
pp.1981). 
Affirmed. 
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RANSAMERICA CASH RESERVE, 
INC., a Maryland Corporation, and 
First National Bank of Boston, Plain-
tiffs, 
v. 
arrell G. HAFEN; Transworld Securi-
ties, S.A., a Corporation, Does 1 
through 100 inclusive; and Dixie Power 
and Water, Inc., Defendants. 
No. 20450. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 5, 1986. 
Summary judgment was awarded in 
vor of plaintiffs in the Fifth District 
>urt, Washington County, J. Harlan 
urns, J., and defendants appealed. The 
ipreme Court held that: (1) one defend-
t's objections to unsigned findings and 
elusions of law in support of summary 
•<mt were abortive, and thus, subse-
ier striking unsigned findings was 
to dispose of defendant's motion 
nmary judgment, and (2) one 
t^ion to amend summary 
be resolved before any 
appeal could be taken from summary judg-
ment 
Appeals dismissed; case remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error <£=>428(2) 
Notice of appeal filed before disposi-
tion of proper postjudgment motion is inef-
fective to confer jurisdiction upon Supreme 
Court Rules App.Proc, Rule 4(b). - .. 
2. Appeal and Error <s=>344 
Finality of judgment is suspended 
upon timely filing of postjudgment motion, 
and time for appeal does not commence 
until final disposition of such motion. 
Rules App.Proc, Rule 4(b). 
3. Judgment <3=*189, 325 
Defendant's objections to unsigned 
findings and conclusions of law in support 
of summary judgment were abortive, and 
thus, subsequent order striking unsigned 
findings was ineffective to dispose of de-
fendant's motion to amend summary judg-
ment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a); Rules 
App.Proc, Rule 4(a, b). 
4. Appeal and Error <3=>346(2) 
Defendant's motion to amend summa-
ry judgment had to be resolved before any 
appeal could be taken from summary judg-
ment Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a); Rules 
App.Proc, Rule 4(a, b). 
5. Appeal and Error <3=>78(1), 345(1) 
Untimely motion for "reconsideration" 
had no effect upon either finality of sum-
mary judgment or running of time for any 
appeal. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a); Rules 
App.Proc, Rule 4(a, b). 
Scott A. Gubler, St. George, for plain-
tiffs. 
John L. Miles, MacArthur Wright, St 
George, Darrell G. Hafen, Upland, Cal., for 
defendants. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendants separately appeal a summary 
judgment award of $93,400 against them 
and in favor of plaintiffs. In the absence 
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